By akademiotoelektronik, 24/10/2022

The nightmare of 737 Max continues to worsen, An overwhelming report of US Chamber Investigators shows the worst security failure in the floor -to -floor plane due to software problems

The fact that two brand new planes, with a recent derived model, crashed five months apart, killing 346 passengers and crew members, is extraordinary and unprecedented in modern times.If multiple factors have led to these accidents, the two crashes have in common a key factor that has contributed to it: a new software system called "maneuvering characteristics increase system" (MCAS), which Boeing has developed to solve stability problemscertain flight conditions induced by the new more powerful engines of the plane.Three days after the accident of Ethiopian Airlines, the FAA nailed to the ground on the 737 max a little later, after similar measures were already taken by China, the European Union and Canada, among others.Almost a year after the second crash of the Boeing 737 Max, an overwhelming report of the Transport and Infrastructure Committee of the House of Representatives published on Friday concluded that engineering errors and the "concealment culture" of theAmerican aircraft manufacturer Boeing, associated with insufficient federal security surveillance, led to two fatal accidents of the manufacturer's 737 max 737 max.According to Clive Irving, reporter for the Daily Beast since the first crash of the 737 Max on October 29, 2018, in the history of air accident surveys, since the start of the era of jet planes, 60 years ago,There has never been such a serious and lasting failure of protection systems intended to ensure flight safety.According to the reporter, from the start, a carefully orchestrated and supported campaign of Boeing to withstand the immobilization of his best-selling on the ground has blocked and misleads many journalists, including himself.According to Irving, it was obvious to him and for other experienced journalists than the pilots of the planes involved in the crashes had been quickly exceeded by a problem which they had not been trained to prepare because it was linked to a newcontrol system, the MCAS, whose existence they even did not know.And yet, Boeing insisted on the fact that the pilots could have overcome this fatal failure by dealing it as a state known as the "runaway stabilizer" - which was in fact included in the flight manual as an inherited element- even if the actions launched by the MCAS were much more extreme.According to the report of the Chamber, Boeing knew all the time that the pilots had only 10 seconds to identify the problem and treat it before being exceeded by the malicious actions of MCAS.And when the MCAS triggered fatally, in the case of the two crashes, it reacted to false data provided by a sensor located on the nose of the plane, which suggested that the plane was dropping out, whileThis was not the case.The Chamber's report confirms that at least 80 % of the world's world fleet of jets were not equipped with a light indicator that would have alerted the pilots with a false reading - because it was an additional optionthat the airlines have chosen not to adopt.La négligence de la compagnie encouragée par les régulateurs américainsSelon le Daily Beast, la révélation la plus consternante sur l'effondrement complet de l'éthique de la sécurité au sein de la direction de Boeing est peut-être le fait que, tout au long du développement de l'avion, les ingénieurs ont fréquemment averti que des décisions étaient prises qui mettaient en péril sa sécurité.In fact, commission investigators say that their report has been informed by "many denouncators".In early 2017, when the FAA certified that the max could fly safely, it was clear that the agency's culture was as resolutely in denial as that of Boeing, according to the Daily Beast, even S 'There were already people at the FAA who knew how dangerous the situation was.For example, as the report points out, after the Lion Air accident, the FAA carried out a risk assessment which calculated that if no correction was made to the known defects of the plane, there would beat least 15 other catastrophic accidents during the planned service of the plane.However, Boeing and FAA refused to take measures, because more and more planes come into service every week until, on March 10, 2019, another plane operated by Ethiopian Airlines crashed, killing the157 passengers and crew members.And, even at that time, the FAA was the last regulatory body in the world to nail the planes on the ground, after homologous organizations have already taken action.The report also reveals for the first time that in 2013, a Boeing engineer suggested that the maximum equipped with a synthetic speed indicator, a computer system used for the first time on the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, which would have provided amuch more reliable rescue system in the event of false readings.But Boeing management rejected this proposal because it would have involved providing the pilots with a simulator training what the company was determined to avoid in order to reduce costs.Still within the framework of flight security, the report reveals that in 2017, the Boeing -Chief Test Pilot responded to the suggestions that the simulator training was necessary because of the MCAS system, saying: "Boeingwill not allow this to happen.We will find ourselves face to face with any regulator who will try to make a requirement ”.Des défauts de conception technique et un manque de transparence avec les régulateurs et les clients dans le développement du 737 Max à l’origine des crashsDans les conclusions des résultats de son enquête préliminaire, la commission des transports et des infrastructures de la Chambre des représentants a déclaré : « La conception et le développement du 737 MAX par Boeing ont été entachés par des défauts de conception technique, un manque de transparence avec les régulateurs et les clients, et des efforts pour brouiller les informations sur l'exploitation de l'avion ».According to the report, during the development of the 737 max, Boeing engineers raised security concerns concerning the fact that the MCAS is linked to a single angle of attack sensor.Following the tragedies of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines, Boeing recognized some of these problems by providing, among other things, to have two AOA sensors to feed the MCAS.According to the report, despite the fact that the internal directive of Boeing for the 737 Max program indicated very clearly in January 2020 that nothing should compromise the training requirements of level B pilots without simulator, "Boeing has revealed by recommending that'Simulator training is necessary before the 737 max return to service.Boeing's responses to security problems raised in the 737 max program have always been too late, ”reads the report.The Chamber's report also concluded that "the commission's investigation also revealed that the Boeing certification exam by the FAA 737 Max was clearly insufficient and that the FAA failed to identify the mainsecurity problems and ensure that they were adequately treated during the certification process.The combination of these problems condemned the flights of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines ”.Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing defended its MCAS development with the FAA, writing that there was "no violation or non-compliance with the process" on multiple questions, including assessmentby Boeing of the "repeated and unintentional MCAS" activation, according to the report."The fact that multiple errors of technical design or certification have been deemed" compliant "by the FAA shows that it is essential to carry out legislative and regulatory reforms.The development of a Transaire Transport Transport Compliance with FAA regulations but fundamentally defective and dangerous highlights an aviation monitoring system which desperately needed to be repaired, "wrote investigators.Dennis Muilenburg, the boss of Boeing resigned in December and was replaced by David Calhoun.The latter told the New York Times that Muilenburg had made the profits pass before quality: "I can never judge what motivated Dennis, whether it was the price of the action that was going to continue to go up and climb,or that it is simply the fact of beat the other type...If someone ran on the rainbow for the golden pot on the stock market, it's him ”.But the fact is that M.Calhoun himself was a member of the Boeing board of directors throughout the maximum development period.When he was challenged on this point by the Times, he said: "The administrators are invested in their CEOs until they are no longer".This attitude shows that Boeing governance standards are as worrying as its engineering standards."Boeing was incompetent, but the congress is just as faulty," wrote a commentator.Indeed, according to him, "the FAA was slow to certify the planes, the Congress wanted to save money, so they left Boeing certifying their own planes".This is "what you get when you do not properly finance a regulatory body," he added. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ?Source : Rapport d’enquête préliminaireEt vous ? Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que pensez-vous des conclusions de l’enquête préliminaire ? Quels commentaires faites-vous des révélations des enquêteurs concernant les négligences de Boeing encouragées par les régulateurs ?Pensez-vous aussi, comme le commentateur, que le Congrès est fautif ? Lire aussi Boeing a officiellement cessé de fabriquer les avions 737 Max cloués au sol à cause des problèmes logiciels, pendant qu'Airbus a décidé d'augmenter la production de l'A321 Neo Boeing travaillerait sur un nouveau système de contrôle de vol pour son 737 MAX, dont le fonctionnement repose sur deux ordinateurs plutôt qu'un seul L'immobilisation du 737 MAX est un tel désastre que les compagnies aériennes louent des 737-200 de 30 ans d'âge, pour répondre à la demande croissante L'actuel PDG de Boeing, Dennis Muilenburg, démissionne, suite aux catastrophes liées au système anti-décrochage MCAS cette année